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PROCEDURAL OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING
HEARSAY ISSUES
Roger C. Park*
A COMMEr ON RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN'S "IMPROVING THE
PROCEDURE FOR RESOLVING HEARSAY ISSUES"

In his admirable paper, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving
Hearsay Issues,' and in another soon to follow,2 Professor Richard
Friedman has explored hearsay procedure with creativity and depth.
He has suggestcd new procedural options, discussed below, that could
at times replac,. rulings that sustain or overrule hearsay objections.
Though others have noted that procedural devices such as notice
could be used to ameliorate the impact of admitting hearsay,3 Professor Friedman's new array of options is an original contribution to the
hearsay literature.
Professor Friedman's first suggestion for improvement involves
an important but incidental issue. He argues that when the opponent
causes a declarant to be produced for live testimony, the declarant
should ordinarily be examined as if she had been produced by the
proponent. The proponent should put her on the stand, elicit her testimony on direct, and then offer her for cross-examination. 4 I agree
completely with this point. This proposal deserves support, whatever
the fate of Professor Friedman's other procedural suggestions.
His second, point involves dividing the burdens of producing the
declarant. He argues that when a hearsay declarant is possibly available, procedural options other than simply admitting or excluding the
declarant's out-of-court statements ought to be considered. 5
Under cur rent law, the trial court unconditionally admits or excludes a hearsay statement. When it admits a hearsay statement, the
court, in effect, places the whole burden of producing the declarant
upon the oppornent of the statement. If the opponent wants to cross* Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I wish to thank my
colleague, Dan Farly.br, for helpful comments on this paper.
I Friedman, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving HearsayIssues, 13 CARDOZO L. REV.
883 (1991) [hereinafter Improving Procedure].
2 R. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay (1991)
(unpublished manus,-ript, to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Minnesota Law
Review).
3 See Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. REv. 331, 338-42 (1961).
4 Friedman, Improving Procedure, supra note 1, at 892.

5 Id. at 905.

929

HeinOnline -- 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 929 1991 - 1992

930

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:929

examine the declarant, the opponent must identify and locate the declarant, secure her presence by persuasion or subpoena, arrange for
her travel, and pay her expenses. When it excludes a hearsay statement, the court, in effect, places the whole burden of producing the
declarant upon the proponent, who must arrange and pay for the declarant's appearance in order to have her evidence.
Professor Friedman points out that the various burdens of producing the declarant can be unbundled. The burden of producing the
declarant can be broken down into the "physical burden" ("the actual
work required to procure the declarant's testimony") 6 and the "financial burden" ("the cost of doing that work").7 Alternatively, it could
be divided into specific tasks.' For example, one party might be required to locate the declarant, while the other might be required to
arrange and pay for travel. The party that failed to do its assigned
tasks would suffer an adverse evidentiary consequence-the undesired
admission or exclusion of the hearsay-or, in rare cases, an additional
sanction. 9
Although the paper's distinction between "physical" and "financial" burdens is useful shorthand, the difference between the two is
often of no importance. The "physical" burden of making airline and
hotel reservations, for example, is actually a particular type of financial burden, consisting of the cost of internal staff work. Placing the
burden of making reservations on one party and the burden of paying
airfare on the other is merely a way of dividing a financial burden.
The division of the burden does not affect the overall cost of
production.
Yet there are situations in which one of the parties has superior
access to a resource necessary to produce the declarant. Then, the
court can reduce the overall cost of production by forcing that party
to use its power. In these situations, Professor Friedman's suggestion
that burdens be unbundled has much appeal. A party's superior access might take the following forms:
a. Superior access to information about the identity and location of
the declarant;
b. Superior access to means of transportation;
c. Superior access to means of persuading or coercing the declarant
to waive a right not to testify;
Id. at 917-20.
Id.
8 Id. at 905-17, 921-22.
9 See id. at 915-16 (indicating that a sanction would be appropriate when an opponent
who has been assigned the physical burden of production fails to produce because the opponent prefers to have the proponent offer hearsay instead of live testimony).
6
7
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Superior access to means of extinguishing a right not to testify
possessed ty the declarant.
In all of these situations, a good argument can be made that the court
should be allowed to impose upon the party with superior access the
obligation to use that access, even when the other party ought to bear
the cost of producing the declarant.
In evaluating the question whether judges should compel a party
to use superior access, each situation ought to be considered on its
own merits. When one party has superior access to information about
identity and location, or to transportation, the question is easy. Forcing that party to use its access serves truth-finding without impinging
on any significant countervailing values.
Situations in which a party has superior access to persuasion or
coercion are more problematic. In these situations, a rule based on
extrinsic policy protects the declarant from being forced to testify.
The policy may be one of convenience (as when distance puts the declarant beyond the subpoena power) or of protection of a private relationship (as when the declarant has a right not to testify against a
spouse). Justice will sometimes be served by requiring one of the parties to persuade a spouse or to coerce an employee to give up a right
not to testify, but the cost of undermining the policy behind the right
ought to be taken into account. Moreover, enforcement may pose
problems of administration. The court may have difficulty determining whether tht party bearing the burden made a good faith effort to
persuade. When the burden-bearer has a close relationship to a declarant whose live testimony would harm the burden-bearer's case,
that party's superior power to persuade may not be fully transferable
to the adversary. In any event, it will not be easy to determine
whether the party made a bona fide effort.
The final situation, in which one party has superior means to
extinguish a right not to testify, is illustrated by the example in hypothetical 7 of Professor Friedman's paper.'° There, the prosecutor, in
order to use a hearsay statement, would be compelled to grant immunity or plea bargain for a conviction. The immunity or conviction
would extinguish the declarant's fifth amendment privilege and pave
the way for compelled testimony. Adopting this solution imposes social costs exteinal to the trial in which the statement is offered. The
prosecution's need to use reliable hearsay in the instant case has become a bargaining chip for a party in another case. A fact unrelated
to that other party's culpability will influence the sanction that party
10 Id. at 909.
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receives. This often happens, but we should still seek to avoid it when
possible. '
Given that unbundling the burdens sometimes makes sense, the
next question is how to translate Professor Friedman's insights into
law reform. After we examine "unbundling," what is around the
comer?
The procedural benefits of "unbundling" might be sought in a
system that eliminated class exceptions to the hearsay rule. One
could replace class exceptions with a single rule that hearsay is admissible, subject to a suitable division of the burden of producing an
available declarant. One would probably want to add some provision
allowing the judge to exclude hearsay when its prejudicial impact
clearly outweighed its probative value.12 In other words, there would
be no specific exceptions for business records, present sense impressions, or the like. Instead, the trial judge would weigh probative value
against prejudicial effect on an ad hoc basis. Upon a finding of adequate value, the trial judge would consider, in cases in which the declarant was available, how to allocate the burden of production. If a
party failed to satisfy a burden, the trial judge could impose an adverse evidentiary consequence.
I have two misgivings about this approach. First, it would give
more discretion to the trial judge than the present system of class exceptions. Second, it would not operate effectively unless the parties
gave prior notice of their intent to introduce hearsay, along with a
description of the statements to be introduced and their source. It is
true that some of the objectives of the burden-splitting system could
be achieved even in the absence of pretrial notice. However, any system that substitutes declarant-production for flat admission or exclusion of hearsay will not work healthily without a high incidence of
pretrial notice. Pretrial notice is needed to facilitate decisions about
burden allocation and to give time to make arrangements for declarant production. Judges would have to encourage notice by treating
those who gave notice more favorably than those who, without excuse, failed to do so. Cautious litigants would feel obliged to give
I

There may be other dangers associated with grants of immunity to defense witnesses,

such as the danger that the prosecution will restrict its cross-examination of the declarant in
order to avoid expanding the scope of use immunity. See W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 881-82 (1985).
12 Professor Friedman has shared with me his soon-to-be published sequel, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, supra note 2. This manuscript seems to
me to advance something like the proposal that I have just described. I should emphasize,
however, that my guess about his views is by no means a full description of them, nor is his
manuscript in its final form.
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pretrial notice of intent to offer many statements that are now routinely received without notice under the class exceptions. This notice
requirement would be onerous.
I believe that the procedural approach described in Professor
Friedman's paper has great merit. However, it should be used as part
of a system that retains at least a reduced list of class exceptions. If a
hearsay statement fits one of the class exceptions, then it should be
admissible without notice and without making any decision about
burden allocation. If it does not, then upon notice the judge would
have authority to receive it, subject to a fair allocation of the burden
13
of producing an available declarant.
It is difficult to predict the impact of Professor Friedman's papers on hearsay reform. It is easy, however, to predict that they will
have a significant and lasting impact on hearsay scholarship.
13 In 1987, I suggcsted creation of a residual exception, applicable to civil cases, that would
admit first-hand hearsay upon notice without screening for reliability. Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 119-22 (1987). I believed that when the
declarant was availalle, notice and the opportunity to call the declarant provided adequate
protection to the opponent. I thought then that it was generally appropriate for the opponent
to bear the cost of production, though I said that in some (unspecified) situations cost-shifting

might be appropriate. Id. at 119-20. Were I to write that piece again, I would incorporate
many of Professor Friedman's insights about cost-shifting. I believe that we would still differ
about hearsay reform, however, because I suspect him of harboring a dislike of the class exceptions-a dislike that 'I do not fully share.
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